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EFFECTS OF UNION ORGANIZATION 
ON STRIKE INCIDENCE IN EU COMPANIES
GIEDO JANSEN*
The author reinvestigates the relationship between the organiza-
tional power of trade unions and strikes based on data from the 
European Company Survey 2009 (ECS- 2009) and the Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention 
and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) database, which include more than 
5,000 firms across all 27 European Union (EU) member states. He 
shows that the incidence of strikes is higher in companies for which 
workplace union membership is high, the number of workplace 
unions is high, and unions dominate establishment- level works 
councils. These factors interact to affect strike incidence. In addi-
tion, the company- level effects of union organization on strike inci-
dence vary across countries. These country differences can partially 
be explained by differences in national trade union systems, such as 
decentralization and membership density.
The presence of trade unions is generally considered a prerequisite for labor strikes; without organization, people lack the ability for collective 
action to address their grievances (Snyder 1975; Franzosi 1989). The asso-
ciation between union organization and strike incidence is well documented 
in the literature (e.g., Ross and Irwin 1951; Shorter and Tilly 1974; Snyder 
1975; Edwards 1978; Kaufman 1982; Wheeler 1984; Shalev 1992; Tsebelis 
and Lange 1995; Piazza 2005). Most empirical studies on this matter are 
based on observations at a national level. Over the last few decades, how-
ever, collective bargaining has decentralized in many countries. Since the 
1980s, collective bargaining in Western Europe has shifted away from na-
tional industry- wide bargaining toward the level of individual firms (Katz 
1993; Supiot 2001; Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittel 2001). Today, company- level 
bargaining is often a part of the collective bargaining process. When bar-
gaining predominately occurs at higher levels, firm- level negotiations fre-
quently follow broader sectoral or national negotiations. Even more than in 
Western European nations, most (wage) bargaining in the new EU member 
states currently occurs at the local, company level (Welz and Kauppinen 
2004; also see the data by Visser 2011).
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To date, however, company- level evidence regarding union organization 
and strike activity is limited. Because earlier studies at the company level 
(e.g., Blanchflower and Cubbin 1986; Gramm 1986; Drago and Wooden 
1990; Machin, Stewart, and Van Reenen 1993; Dobson 1997) or negotiation 
level (e.g., Ingram, Metcalf, and Wadsworth 1993; Campolieti, Hebdon, and 
Hyatt 2005) have covered only one or a few companies or countries, the 
generalizability of these results is low. Moreover, because only a few studies 
have used cross- national data sets to examine the link between union orga-
nization and strike incidence, the findings concerning country- to- country 
differences in this relationship are inconclusive (e.g., the two- country com-
parisons of Coutrot [1998] as well as Whitfield, Marginson, and Brown 
[1994]). An additional shortcoming of these studies is that they were unable 
to measure and formally test the intervening effect of the national context; 
rather, they inferred that context matters based on the finding that the ef-
fects that local unions have on strikes sometimes differs by country. For ex-
ample, Coutrot (1998) found that the ability of trade unions to initiate a 
strike is more dependent on membership levels in Britain than in France. 
He interpreted this finding as an effect of differences in legal constraints on 
the unions’ abilities to organize collective action. Coutrot (1998: 190) ar-
gued that British unions “have been obliged to hold a ballot before launch-
ing a lawful strike, while their French counterparts have no such obligation.” 
Although this interpretation suggests that the magnitude of the relation-
ship between unions and strikes depends on national conditions, more 
stringent analyses are required to formally test whether the national labor 
context influences firm- level industrial relationships.
In this article I employ data from the European Company Survey, 2009 
(ECS- 2009) initiated by Eurofound. The data from this large- scale cross- 
national workplace survey in the European Union (EU) allow researchers 
to examine trade unions and strikes in more than 5,000 firms across all 27 
EU member states. Using this data, I investigate the relationship between 
the organizational power of trade unions and industrial conflict in the EU 
while making three contributions to the literature. First, hypotheses are 
tested regarding union organization and strikes at the level of individual 
companies. A focus on local union organization has become increasingly 
relevant as a result of the move toward decentralized collective bargaining 
(Hancké 1993; Benson and Gospel 2008). Second, the strong comparative 
character of this study exceeds the scope of previous workplace studies. To 
my knowledge, no other study examines strikes within individual companies 
and compares more than two countries. Third, I conduct analyses that are 
not only cross- national but also multi- and cross- level in nature. Progress is 
made by supplementing the ECS- 2009 data with country- level data from the 
database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, 
State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) (Visser 2011) and by using 
multilevel models to examine how national union characteristics influence 
the association between union organization and strikes in EU companies. 
Specifically, with this study I aim to answer two questions: 1) To what extent 
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is strike incidence associated with union organization at the company level 
in EU countries? 2) To what extent do national trade union systems condi-
tion the company- level associations between strike incidence and union or-
ganization?
The Need for a Company- Level Analysis 
in a Cross- National Perspective
Differences in strike incidence are, from the perspective of resource mobili-
zation (see Franzosi 1995), related to variations in union organization be-
cause unions facilitate the capacity and means for collective action. I assess 
the effects of three indicators of local trade union organization on strike 
incidence: union membership rate, multi- unionism, and union- dominated works 
councils. These indicators are related to strikes given that they either in-
crease or decrease a union’s organizational capacity in times of mobilization 
for collective action.
Union Organization and Strikes at the Workplace
Union membership rate is sometimes considered a key indicator for the “capac-
ity to strike” (Shorter and Tilly 1974; Snyder 1975; Kaufman 1982). Scholars 
assume that the decision to strike is predominantly made by unions and that 
in principle only union members will strike (Snyder 1975). Therefore, the 
capacity to strike should increase as union membership among workers in-
creases. The vast majority of previous studies examining the association be-
tween union membership and strikes have relied on observations at the 
country or state level. Workplace surveys can assess the extent to which this 
relationship is also observable at the level of individual firms. An examina-
tion of the international comparative literature, however, reveals that only a 
few workplace surveys are available, and these studies only modestly test the 
aforementioned relationship. For example, based on company- level data 
from British firms in the 1980s, Blanchflower and Cubbin (1986) found that 
higher rates of unionized manual workers are associated with a greater pro-
pensity for industrial action, including strikes. Coutrot (1998) compared 
British and French firms in the 1990s and concluded that, although the ef-
fect of union density is positive and significant in both countries, it was 
stronger in Britain than in France. “French unions are able to launch strikes 
even when they organize a small portion of the workforce, while British 
unions’ ability to do so is more dependent on their levels of membership” 
(Coutrot 1998: 198). In the present study, I provide a more rigorous test of 
the relationship between membership rate and strikes by investigating this 
effect in companies across all EU countries.
Second, the number of trade unions represented at the workplace indi-
cates a division within the labor movement (i.e., “multi- unionism”; Clegg 
1976; Korpi and Shalev 1979; Dobson 1997; Akkerman 2008; Hartcourt and 
Lam 2011). When more than one trade union is available to represent 
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workers, union competition may occur, which increases the potential for 
strikes.1 The empirical status of multi- unionism, however, is not clear. Early 
national- level studies demonstrated that union competition is not associ-
ated with higher levels of strikes in all countries. For example, Ross and 
Hartman (1960) noted that the Netherlands is a significant exception; al-
though pervasive divisions exist within the labor movement, strikes do not 
occur frequently. Focusing on the sector level, Akkerman (2000) demon-
strated that the relationship between multi- unionism and strikes differed 
across countries. The few available studies at the company level demonstrate 
a positive effect of multi- union representation on the number of strikes. An 
analysis of workplace surveys in Britain (Ingram et al. 1993; Machin et al. 
1993; Dobson 1997) revealed that the presence of more than one union was 
associated with higher strike incidence than single unionism. Drago and 
Wooden (1990) reached a similar conclusion in an analysis of data from a 
1988 survey of Australian workplaces. A drawback, however, of these studies 
is that they were restricted to Australia and the United Kingdom. To deter-
mine whether the conclusions from these studies hold in other settings, in 
this study I investigate the effect of multi- unionism in cross- national per-
spective.
Third, I will examine the effect of union- dominated works councils. The 
strength of a trade union may depend on specific organizational resources 
in individual firms. For example, Blanchflower and Cubbin (1986) showed 
that the presence of a shop steward was associated with a greater propensity 
for industrial action in the 1980s within British firms. Kelly (1996: 81) ar-
gued that unions can extend their influence at the workplace by engaging 
employers using non- bargaining channels, taking part in discussions on is-
sues that are of common interest, such as training, health and safety, and 
productivity. In many EU countries, these issues are organized within local 
bodies for communication between management and the workforce (i.e., in 
works councils). Works council membership is rarely confined to trade 
unionists, although in so- called single- channel systems, unions possess a mo-
nopoly right of representation (see Gumbrell- McCormick and Hyman 
2010). In practice, and especially in dual- channel systems in which unions 
and works councils formally have distinct bases of representation, the de-
marcation between union and nonunion representation is often unclear. 
Unions occasionally dominate works councils (Carley, Baradel, and Welz 
2005). For example, the majority of councilors in large firms in Germany 
are union members (Kelly 1996; Gumbrell- McCormick and Hyman 2010). 
Visser (1995) argued that union- dominated councils help to sustain the or-
ganizing efforts of the union. Certain trade unions may be weak at the local 
workplace in terms of membership but may hold a strong position on works 
1 With respect to multi- union representation, the industrial relations systems in Europe differ substan-
tially from those in North America (Akkerman 2008). Whereas multi- unionism disappeared after the 
1935 Wagner Act in the United States, more than one union is often recognized for collective bargaining 
in Europe, both at the firm and sector levels.
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councils. Therefore, works councils may increase the capacity to strike when 
union- dominated.
In sum, this study reinvigorates the research on the relationship between 
the organizational strength of trade unions and industrial conflict using a 
large- scale analysis at the company level. To test whether, and to what extent, 
the relationship between union organization and strike incidence can be iden-
tified as a company- level phenomenon, I formulate the following hypotheses.
Hypotheses 1a–1c: Strikes are more likely in companies as 
(1a) union membership is higher, 
(1b) the number of unions is higher, and 
(1c) works councils are union- dominated.
The Interplay between Organizational Resources
After formulating general hypotheses regarding the direct effects of union 
organization on strike incidence, I will specify the conditions under which 
these effects might be stronger or weaker. I focus on the interaction among 
the three types of union organization. First, I discuss the potential interplay 
between membership rates and multi- unionism. Following Hypothesis 1a, I 
expect that membership rates in companies are positively correlated with 
strike incidence given that a certain level of organization among employees 
is required for collective action (Franzosi 1989). Multi- unionism indicates 
trade union division and fragmentation (Ross and Hartman 1960; Clegg 
1976; Korpi and Shalev 1979; Akkerman 2008). If Oswald’s claim (1979) is 
correct and division within the labor movement leads to a lack of coopera-
tion between rival unions, then multi- unionism will undermine the union’s 
organizational capacity for mobilization. Different unions might not only 
represent different groups of employees but also articulate different inter-
ests and grievances. When two or more unions are represented at the work-
place, I expect that the overall union membership rate in a firm will be less 
strongly correlated with strikes. Specifically,
Hypothesis 2a: The positive effect of union membership on strike 
incidence weakens as the number of unions increases.
A further potential interaction is between membership rate and the pres-
ence of a union- dominated works council. The hypothesis that strikes are 
more likely in companies with union- dominated works councils is based on 
the assumption that, under these circumstances, the union possesses addi-
tional organizational resources. Unions can, and may choose to, strengthen 
and extend their organizational capacity at the workplace by using works 
councils as alternative channels to communicate with employers and em-
ployees. Therefore, domination over works councils might make a union 
less dependent on general membership rates to mobilize employees and to 
organize a strike. Hence,
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Hypothesis 2b: The positive effect of union membership on strike 
incidence is weaker in companies where works councils are union- 
dominated.
Next, there may be interaction between the effects of multi- unionism and 
union- dominated works councils. If competition undermines interunion co-
operation, then multi- unionism could fragment the unions’ position in the 
works council. Under multi- unionism, employee representatives may be 
members in different unions with distinct membership compositions and 
interests. Therefore, I expect that when two or more unions are represented 
at the workplace, the overall numerical domination of trade unionists in a 
company’s works council will be less strongly correlated with the occurrence 
of a strike. Thus,
Hypothesis 2c: The positive effect of union- dominated works coun-
cils on strike incidence weakens as the number of unions increases.
Trade Union Systems: Company- Level Effects in Context
As previously mentioned, only a few studies have investigated whether the 
national context influences labor relationships and collective action at the 
firm level using cross- national data sets (Whitfield et al. 1994; Coutrot 1998). 
The availability of the ECS- 2009 data enables me to examine not only 
whether, and to what extent, differences occur between EU countries regard-
ing the effect of union organization on strike incidence but also why these 
differences occur. Therefore, this study formally tests whether the relevance 
of local union organization differs across countries. The null hypotheses 
that no country differences exist should be rejected if trade union effects on 
strikes are country- dependent. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3a–3c: The company- level effects on strike incidence 
regarding 
 (3a) union membership rates, 
 (3b) the number of unions, and 
 (3c) union- dominated work councils 
will be different across EU countries.
To study why there might be cross- national differences in the association 
between union organization and strike incidence within companies, I will 
explore the interplay between company- level and country- level organiza-
tional resources. The primary argument to do so is that trade unions might 
rely on a combination of central and decentralized organizations, and na-
tional unions might function as a pool of support and resources for local 
unions (Hancké 1993), constrain local union autonomy (Benson and Gos-
pel 2008), or both. In this respect, resources and constraints for mobiliza-
tion may relate to location of the decisions concerning union activities, to 
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where the funds are held and spent, and to sources of recognition and le-
gitimacy (Benson and Gospel 2008). The capacity of local unions to engage 
in industrial conflict should therefore be studied with regard to national 
union structures. I focus on three features of the trade union system that 
might strengthen or weaken the union- organization effects at the firm level 
(i.e., a country’s degree of union density, its number of trade union confederations, 
and its level of decentralization in the trade union movement).
Union density is often a macro- level indicator of the power of a labor 
movement and its organizational capacity. The use of this indicator relates 
to the micro- level expectation that higher membership rates in companies 
are positively correlated with the occurrence of strikes. Furthermore, the 
resources for organizing and initiating a strike in companies might also be 
greater when national levels of union density are higher. For example, the 
number of fee- paying members will partially determine the amount of fi-
nancial resources that a union has at its disposal. National unions might fi-
nance local branches or allocate money to strike funds. To enable a strike, 
workplace branches might benefit from the resources of national unions or 
confederations. Consequently, local branches will be less dependent on 
company- level resources when national membership rates are high.
Hypothesis 4: The company- level effects of union organization on 
strike incidence are weaker in countries where union density is 
higher.
Similarly, I expect a moderating effect of the fragmentation of a country’s 
labor movement. As I argued earlier, multi- unionism will undermine the 
organizational resources that are associated with high membership rates. In 
addition to multi- unionism at individual companies, however, the fragmen-
tation of the national labor movement may have a similar effect. In a coun-
try in which the labor movement is divided into a wide array of trade unions 
and union confederations, the various unions may articulate different inter-
ests and grievances, diminishing the capacity to mobilize members at the 
workplace. This observation leads to my second cross- level interaction hy-
pothesis.
Hypothesis 5: The company- level effects of union organization on 
strike incidence are weaker in countries where the number of 
confederations is higher.
Finally, I investigate the degree of decentralization in the national labor 
movement. I expect that the capacity for the collective action of local unions 
depends on their own autonomy and, in turn, the control of national con-
federations. Greater independence of local branches and representatives 
might advance the capacity of workplace unions to initiate a strike. The au-
tonomy of a local union might be greater when national interventions in 
company- level negotiations are few, no vetoes are passed on enterprise strikes, 
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and the local union has independent control over finances or over the ap-
pointment of workplace representatives (Benson and Gospel 2008; Visser 
2011). Under these circumstances, workplace branches will have greater au-
tonomy to launch a strike without being constrained by the regulations of 
the national trade union. Therefore, I expect that the local union branches 
of countries with decentralized unions will depend less on organizational 
factors for the initiation of a strike.
Hypothesis 6: The company- level effects of union organization on 
strike incidence are weaker in countries where the union move-
ment is more decentralized.
Data, Measures, and Methods
I use data from the European Company Survey, 2009 (Eurofound and TNS 
Infratest 2010). The ECS- 2009 is a large- scale representative survey of firms 
in both the private and public sectors across all EU- 27 countries and three 
acceding and candidate countries (i.e., Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey). 
Interviews with managers and employee representatives were conducted in 
more than 27,000 companies with 10 or more employees. Approximately all 
sectors of activity (nace rev.1.1) were included in the sample with the excep-
tion of the agricultural sector, private households, and extraterritorial orga-
nizations. Management interviews, with the most senior official responsible 
for personnel in each firm, were conducted in all companies (N = 27,160). 
Interviews with an employee representative, preferably the chairperson of 
the most important employee representative body in the firm, were con-
ducted in approximately 25% of the companies (N = 6,569).2 Because infor-
mation on strikes, union organization, and works councils must be obtained 
from the interview with the employee representative, I am able to include 
only firms with both types of interviews. The analyses include only compa-
nies from EU- 27 countries without missing information on relevant vari-
ables. Ultimately, the sample contains 5,873 companies.
The ECS- 2009 data are used to conduct a series of multilevel analyses that 
combine information on EU companies with the characteristics of the coun-
tries from which they were established. Because the dependent variable, 
strike incidence, is dichotomous, I estimate a logistic model. In doing so, I 
employ a two- level hierarchical design in which companies (Level 1) are 
nested within countries (Level 2). At the lowest level (N = 5,873), I include 
variables related to union organization at the workplace (i.e., union mem-
bership rate, multi- unionism, and union- dominated works councils). To ac-
count for differences between individual companies and their likelihood of 
experiencing industrial action, I control for company size, the economic 
sector of activity, status (i.e., independent, subsidiary site, or headquarters), 
2 For a more comprehensive discussion of the ECS- 2009, consult the Technical Report (Riedmann 
2009).
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public ownership, and the level upon which the collective agreement in 
each company, if any, was negotiated. At the highest level (N = 27),3 country- 
specific variables related to the trade union system are included using infor-
mation for 2008 from the ICTWSS database (Visser 2011). I discuss the 
measurement of my key variables in greater detail below. Descriptive statis-
tics are presented in Appendix A.
Dependent Variable
I measure strike incidence using reports on industrial action from the em-
ployee representative. Respondents were asked whether there have been 
one or more instances of industrial action in their establishment over the 
past 12 months, and if so, what form of action this took: 1) stoppage of work 
or strike; 2) strike of one day or more; 3) refusal to work overtime; and 4) 
other actions. Unfortunately, the first two response categories are not mutu-
ally exclusive and do not allow me to differentiate between work stoppages 
and strikes. Therefore, I construct a binary variable (1/0) to distinguish 
companies in which at least one strike or work stoppage occurred over the 
past 12 months (collapsing Category 1 and 2) from companies with no or 
other forms of industrial action (collapsing Categories 3 and 4 with all com-
panies without reported industrial action).4
Independent Variables
Union Membership Rate
Employee representatives estimated the proportion of employees in their 
establishment who belonged to a trade union. When the employee repre-
sentative was not aware of this information, he or she was asked to make an 
estimation, using fixed categories of “none,” “less than 20%,” “20% to less 
than 40%,” “40% to less than 60%,” “60% to less than 80%,” “80% to less 
than 100%,” or “All.” When an estimate was reported as a category, I recode 
this information into a proportion by taking the category midpoint (e.g., 
“20% to less than 40%” is recoded as 30%). I recode this variable so that it 
ranges from 0.0 (no union members) to 10.0 (100% union members).
Number of Unions
I use the number of trade unions represented at the workplace as a proxy 
for multi- unionism. The maximum number of unions is truncated at 11, 
3 There are varying rules of thumb regarding the minimum number of observations in multilevel 
analysis. In general, these rules suggest that greater numbers at both levels increase the accuracy of the 
estimates and standard errors. With respect to the country level, advice ranges from no minimum (Gel-
man and Hill 2007) to at least 50 (for a discussion see Hox 2010). The current research investigates 
countries in the EU; therefore, 27 is the maximum number of country- level observations.
4 Alternative coding of the dependent variable, for example, contrasting any form of action with no 
action at all, produces similar results to those presented in this article.
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and only 0.4% of the firms reported more than 11 unions. Note that this 
measure disregards the potential dissimilarities in the bases for distinctions 
among unions (e.g., occupational, political, or religious divisions). Multi- 
unionism may only be related to interunion competition when two or more 
unions represent the same type of workers. Unfortunately, the ECS data do 
not permit the study of this feature of multi- unionism.
Union- Dominated Works Councils
I measure union membership among employee representatives in a manner 
similar to the procedure that measures union membership rate among the 
workforce. I use this information to construct a dummy variable that indi-
cates whether the majority (>50%) of the works councilors are union mem-
bers (1) or not (0).
Before including the union organization variables into the analyses, two 
transformations are conducted. First, I transform union membership rate 
and the number of unions into their natural logarithm. By taking the loga-
rithm of both variables, I account for the fact that the effects of union mem-
bership rate and the number of unions on strike incidence might not be 
linear. Preliminary analyses demonstrate that with the log transformations, 
the models presented in this article yield a better model fit,5 suggesting that 
there may be diminishing returns in the effects of union membership rate 
and the number of unions on strikes. Second, all three variables are centered 
at the country mean. Using group- mean centering is often recommended in 
multilevel modeling when interaction effects are of substantive interest, es-
pecially when cross- level interactions are involved. Without centering, or 
with grand- mean centering, cross- level interactions are sometimes con-
founded with between- group interactions (cf. Hofmann and Gavin 1998; 
Enders and Tofighi 2007; Hox 2010). Because this recommendation stands 
“regardless of whether the predictor is continuous or binary” (Enders and 
Tofighi 2007: 135), I also centered the dummy- variable for union- dominated 
works councils at its country- mean value.
Country- Level Variables
Union Density Rate
This variable from the ICTWSS database measures the net union member-
ship as a proportion of the wage and salary earners in employment (i.e., the 
total number of union members [minus union members outside the active 
labor force]*100, divided by the number of employed- wage and salary 
5 In multilevel modeling, Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) is used as a general fit index (Hox 
2010). The model with the lowest AIC value is usually the preferred model. The AIC statistic of the model 
with the log transforms was 3391, whereas this value was 3404 for the model with a linear effect of union 
membership rate and 3398 for the model with a linear effect of multi- unionism. The effect of multi- 
unionism was not significant without the logarithmic transformation.
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workers in the OECD Labour Force Statistics). This variable ranges from 7.27 
in Estonia to 68.27 in Sweden.
Number of Confederations
The number of union confederations in the ICTWSS database ranges from 
1 to 7. Only central organizations are included (i.e., confederations with af-
filiate unions and memberships that exceed 5% of the total union member-
ship in that country). Smaller confederations are ignored and considered 
part of the independent, autonomous, or unaffiliated union membership.
Union Decentralization
The ICTWSS database includes a summary measure of the power that 
unions have over their local or workplace branches and representatives. 
This measure is the sum of five items that are measured on a 3- point scale 
(0–2): union power in local wage bargaining, appointment of workplace 
representatives, finances of local branches, strike funds, and strike vetoes. 
In Visser’s original calculation, the maximum value referred to the situation 
in which the union has “full” authority over local branches. I reverse this 
variable to measure the degree of “union decentralization.” In the countries 
that I study, the metric ranges from 0 for “centralized union system” to 7 for 
“decentralized union system.” In the analyses, all three country- level vari-
ables are included as mean- centered covariates.
Results
Company- Level Effects
In Table 1, I present the results of the multilevel logistic regression analysis 
of strike incidence.6 Model 1 includes five sets of control variables at the 
company level. First, I control for economic activity based on 1- digit nace 
categories with manufacturing and energy (nace Categories C, D, and E) as 
references. Compared with firms in these categories, I find that strikes are 
less likely in most other industries. Only in education (nace M) do I find 
that the odds of experiencing a strike are approximately twice as high 
(e0.699). Strikes are least common in the finance and intermediation indus-
try (nace J).
Second, I control for public sector firms. The positive effect (0.663) indi-
cates that strikes are almost twice as likely in public sector firms compared 
with privately owned firms. To account for cross- national differences in 
strike rights for the public sector, I allow a random slope for the effect of 
6 All models are estimated using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Maechler, and Bolker 2011). To con-
struct Figure 1, I adapted a piece of R code from Kastellec and Leoni (2007). Figure 2 was constructed 
using a function by Baayen (2011).
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Table 1. Results of the Multilevel Logistic Analysis 
of Strike Incidence in EU Companies
Variable
Model 1 Model 2
b (SE) b (SE)
Fixed effects
Constant
–3.931*** (0.37) –3.843*** (0.37)
Company-level variables
Economic activitya (nace CDE = reference)
Nace F –0.598** (0.30) –0.624** (0.30)
Nace G –0.566** (0.23) –0.571** (0.23)
Nace H –0.782* (0.46) –0.748 (0.46)
Nace I –0.184 (0.24) –0.154 (0.24)
Nace J –0.924** (0.42) –0.920** (0.42)
Nace K –0.730*** (0.26) –0.760*** (0.26)
Nace L –0.113 (0.20) –0.161 (0.20)
Nace M –0.699*** (0.20) –0.644*** (0.20)
Nace N –0.094 (0.18) –0.084 (0.18)
Nace O –0.565** (0.28) –0.543* (0.28)
Public sector –0.663*** (0.23) –0.705*** (0.23)
Company size (10–19 employees = reference)
20–49 –0.368 (0.22) –0.363 (0.22)
50–99 –0.332 (0.23) –0.316 (0.23)
100–199 –0.688*** (0.23) –0.667*** (0.23)
200–399 –0.857*** (0.23) –0.825*** (0.23)
400–500 –1.070*** (0.27) –1.047*** (0.27)
500+ –1.330*** (0.23) –1.327*** (0.23)
Company status (independent = reference)
Headquarters –0.261** (0.13) –0.256** (0.13)
Subsidiary site –0.486*** (0.13) –0.491*** (0.13)
Unknown –0.212 (0.27) –0.217 (0.27)
Collective agreement (company level = reference)
None –0.251 (0.19) –0.233 (0.19)
Higher level –0.330*** (0.12) –0.327*** (0.12)
Mixed –0.280 (0.20) –0.276 (0.20)
Company-level union organization
(ln) Union membership rateb –0.574*** (0.10) –0.596*** (0.10)
(ln) Multi-unionismb –0.361*** (0.12) –0.386*** (0.13)
Union-dominated works council –0.296*** (0.11) –0.382*** (0.13)
Interactions
Union membership x Multi-unionism –0.466** (0.21)
Union membership x Works council –0.249 (0.19)
Works council x Multi-unionism –0.220 (0.27)
Random Effects
Variance at Country Level –1.96 (1.40) –1.92 (1.38)
Random Slope Public Sector –0.56 (0.75) –0.58 (0.76)
AIC –3391 –3385
Notes: Nlevel-1 = 5,873; Nlevel-2 = 27.
aNACE: CDE = Manufacturing and energy; F = Construction; G = Wholesale and retail trade; re-
pair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods; H = Hotels and restau-
rants; I = Transport, storage and communication; J = Financial intermediation; K = Real estate, 
renting and business activities; L = Public administration and defense; compulsory social security; 
M = Education; N = Health and social work; O = Other community, social and personal service 
activities.
b (ln) = natural logarithmic transformation
* Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level (two-tailed test).
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public sector firms on strike incidence; thus, I let public sector firms have a 
different effect on strikes across the range of countries in the study. A likeli-
hood ratio test revealed that the random slope model fit the data better 
than a model with only a fixed coefficient for the public sector (LR F2 = 19.3, 
df  =  2). Nevertheless, this random- effects model suggests that a positive 
slope for public sector establishments is found in most countries.7
Third, I account for company size, which is measured using seven catego-
ries with the smallest category (10–19 employees) applied as the reference. 
I find that strikes are more likely as the firm size increases. Relative to the 
smallest category of firms, the odds of larger firms experiencing a strike are 
nearly twice as high (e0.688) when there are 100 to 199 employees, and this 
finding amounts to 2.3 times, 2.9 times, and 3.8 times for workplaces with 
200 to 399, 400 to 500, and 500+ employees, respectively.
Fourth, I control for whether the companies are single and independent 
organizations (the reference) or part of a larger organization (differentiat-
ing between headquarters and subsidiary sites). I also include a dummy in-
dicator for companies in which the manager did not provide clear status 
information. I find that the odds of experiencing a strike are approximately 
1.6 times higher in subsidiary sites compared with independent firms 
(e0.486).
Fifth, I include a set of control variables to indicate whether, and at what 
level, a collective wage agreement covers employees. The reference category 
consists of firms in which the collective agreement is negotiated at the com-
pany level. I find a positive effect for the dummy variable, indicating that 
the collective agreement is negotiated at a higher level (0.330). This result 
suggests that the odds of having a strike are 1.4 times higher when a collec-
tive agreement is in place at a higher level than the firm.
Union Organization Effects
Model 1 supports Hypotheses 1a–1c regarding the relationship between 
union organization and strikes. All three union organization effects are pos-
itive and significant. The positive effects of union membership rate (0.574) 
and multi- unionism (0.361) confirm Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Strikes are 
more likely to occur in companies where 1a) union membership is high and 
1b) the number of unions is high. Moreover, I find a positive and significant 
effect of union- dominated works councils (0.296). This effect implies that 
companies in which trade union members make up more than 50% of the 
local works council are 1.3 times (e0.296) more likely to experience a strike 
than companies without a union majority in the works council. Hence, 
7 In most countries, the country- specific slope does not deviate from the mean slope (0.663). The 
public sector effect is stronger than average for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Portu-
gal, and the United Kingdom, whereas this effect is weaker than average in the Netherlands. The effect 
in Finland is negative (–0.828), which indicates that Finnish public sector establishments are less likely to 
strike than private sector companies.
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Hypothesis 1c is also confirmed: strikes are more likely in companies with 
union- dominated works councils.
Company- Level Interaction Effects
To test Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, I model interactions between the three 
union organization variables. Hypothesis 2a states that strikes are more 
likely in companies as union membership increases but that this effect is 
weaker when many unions are at the workplace. For this hypothesis to be 
supported, I must find a negative effect in the interaction between union 
membership rate and multi- unionism. This finding is confirmed in Model 2 
(Table 1). The main effect of membership rate (0.596) indicates that mem-
bership rate has a positive effect on strike incidence when the log number 
of unions is at its country- mean value. However, the negative interaction ef-
fect (–0.466) indicates that membership rate has a weaker and eventually 
negative effect on strikes when the log number of unions at the workplace is 
greater than the country average. This finding suggests that higher mem-
bership is associated with more strikes only when interunion competition is 
relatively low. In multi- union companies, the capacity to mobilize members 
may diminish because the various unions have a different membership base 
and articulate different interests.
Model 2 shows no support, however, with respect to the other interaction 
hypotheses. In spite of Hypothesis 2b, the interaction between union mem-
bership rate and union- dominated works councils is not found to be signifi-
cant. Hence, the effect of membership rate on strike incidence is not weaker 
in companies with a union- dominated works council. This contradicts the 
expectation that domination over works councils would make a union less 
dependent on general membership rates to mobilize employees and orga-
nize a strike. Also, no statistically significant interaction is found between 
union- dominated works councils and the number of unions. Therefore, Hy-
pothesis 2c, stating that the positive relationship between works council 
domination and strikes would be weaker when the number of unions is 
higher, is not supported. Based on these findings, nothing upholds the as-
sumption that multi- unionism would undermine the organizational capac-
ity of union- dominated works councils.
Cross- National Differences
Country- Specific Effects of Union Organization
To examine whether the influence of the company- level effects of union 
organization on strike incidence differs across countries, I extend Model 1 
to include three random slopes, one for each union organization variable. 
Thus, I allow union membership rate, multi- unionism, and union- dominated 
works councils to have a different effect with regard to strikes in each coun-
try (henceforth, the union organization random effects model). These country- 
specific effects (calculated as the mean slope + deviation from mean slope ± 
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standard error; cf. Gelman and Hill 2007) are displayed in Figure 1. The 
dashed vertical line in each figure is the mean slope of this effect across all 
the countries. The dot plots and error bars indicate the country- specific 
slope coefficients and their standard error intervals, respectively. By visual-
izing the random effects in this manner, I can determine the extent to which 
a country- specific effect differs from the mean slope (caution is needed in in-
terpreting country- specific effects as relative to each other [Gelman and 
Hill 2007: 271]). Figure 1 indicates that Hypothesis 3, which states that dif-
ferences occur among countries with regard to the company- level effects of 
union organization on strike incidence, is supported.
Figure 1A shows that the mean slope of union membership rate is 0.63, 
and this effect is significant at the .01 level. Consistent with Table 1, this 
finding indicates that an increase in membership rate is, on average, associ-
ated with higher likelihood of experiencing a strike. The error bars for the 
majority of countries overlap with the mean slope, which suggests that the 
extent to which membership rate is associated with strike incidence is ap-
proximately similar and positive for most countries. This effect is weaker for 
four countries compared with the average. In particular, the results suggest 
that launching a strike is less dependent on the company- level unionization 
rate in Greece and Italy. In these countries, relatively few union members 
are needed to start a strike. The effect of membership rate is stronger than 
average for Germany and, on the borderline, for Austria. Here, initiating a 
strike requires a relatively strong membership base.
Figure 1B shows that a large amount of variation occurs across countries 
with regard to the associations between multi- unionism and strike inci-
dence. Consistent with Table 1, the mean slope of multi- unionism is positive 
(0.42), which indicates that, on average, strikes are more likely in compa-
nies in which the number of unions is higher. Figure 1B shows that this 
positive effect is particularly strong in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and 
Belgium. In these countries, each additional union is more likely to be as-
sociated with the occurrence of a strike than in most other countries. For 
the majority of the countries, however, I find no indication that the effect of 
multi- unionism is substantially different from the average effect. Only in six 
countries is the association between the number of unions at the workplace 
and the likelihood of a strike clearly weaker, and potentially even negative. 
A negative effect of multi- unionism (as in Denmark, Poland, and maybe the 
United Kingdom) would suggest that strikes are less likely in companies in 
which the number of unions is high.
I also find differences among countries with regard to the effect of union- 
dominated works councils. The mean slope in Figure 1C is not significant, 
which indicates that, on average, whether union members dominate the 
employee representative body in a company does not matter. For many 
countries, the error bars in Figure 1C overlap with the mean slope, and this 
result suggests that union- dominated works councils do not affect strike in-
cidence in those countries. In the top six countries, however, I find a posi-
tive effect of union- dominated works councils, and this effect is the strongest 
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Figure 1. Random Effects of Union-Organization Variables 
on Strike Incidence in EU Companiesa
a The dashed vertical line in each figure represents the mean slope across all countries. The dot plots and 
error bars indicate the country-specific slope coefficients and their standard error intervals, respectively.
A. Country-specific effects of union membership rate on strike incidence
B. Country-specific effects of multi-unionism on 
strike incidence
C. Country-specific effects of union-dominated 
works councils on strike incidence
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for companies in Greece and Germany (Figure 1C). The country- specific 
slope in these countries is approximately 1, which indicates that companies 
with union- dominated works councils are approximately 2.7 times (e1) more 
likely to experience a strike than those without. In other countries, such as 
Sweden, Austria, and Slovakia, I find that this effect may be reversed, which 
suggests that union domination would be associated with fewer strikes.
Cross- Level Interaction Effects
Thus far, I have shown that the relationship between union organization and 
strikes can be found at the level of individual companies. I have also demon-
strated that the magnitude and nature of this relationship differs across 
countries. Next, I test the extent to which the characteristics of national trade 
union systems influence the company- level effects of union  organization. 
Table 2 shows the cross- level interaction effects on strike incidence. These 
Table 2. Cross-Level Interaction Effects Based on a Multilevel 
Logistic Analysis of Strike Incidence in EU companies(a)
Model 3 Model 4
Company-level Company-level
Union membership rate –0.564*** (0.12) Union membership rate –0.759*** (0.13)
Multi-unionism –0.382** (0.22) Multi-unionism –0.382* (0.22)
Union-dominated works 
 council –0.162 (0.19)
Union-dominated works 
  council –0.175 (0.19)
Country-level Country-level
Union Density –0.029** (0.01) Union Density –0.030** (0.01)
Number of Confederations –0.284*** (0.10) Number of Confederations –0.284*** (0.10)
Union Decentralization –0.440*** (0.12) Union Decentralization –0.418*** (0.12)
Cross-level Interactions
Union membership rate
 × Union Density –0.003 (0.01)
 × Number of Confederations –0.056 (0.05)
 × Union Decentralization –0.124** (0.05)
Model 5 Model 6
Company-level Company-level
Union membership rate –0.552*** (0.12) Union membership rate –0.549*** (0.11)
Multi-unionism –0.519** (0.20) Multi-unionism –0.462** (0.22)
Union-dominated works 
  council –0.136 (0.19)
Union-dominated works 
  council –0.025 (0.18)
Country-level Country-level 
Union Density –0.028** (0.01) Union Density –0.003 (0.02)
Number of Confederations –0.300*** (0.10) Number of Confederations –0.281** (0.14)
Union Decentralization –0.428*** (0.12) Union Decentralization –0.141 (0.15)
Cross-level Interactions Cross-level Interactions
Multi-unionism Union-dominated works council
 × Union Density –0.030*** (0.01)  × Union Density –0.023** (0.01)
 × Number of Confederations –0.006 (0.08)  × Number of Confederations –0.019 (0.08)
 × Union Decentralization –0.296*** (0.11)  × Union Decentralization –0.262*** (0.09)
Notes: Controlled for economic activity, company size, company status, public sector and the level of col-
lective agreement (see Table 1).
* Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level (two-tailed test).
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models are built by extending the union organization random effects model; how-
ever, because of space limitations, I present only the interaction coefficients 
between union organization at the individual firms and the country- level 
union characteristics. First, in Model 3, I simultaneously include the context 
variables. The direct effects of union density (0.029), the number of confed-
erations (0.284), and union decentralization (0.440) suggest that compa-
nies are more likely to experience strikes in countries where union density 
and the number of confederations are high, and where trade union move-
ment is decentralized. In the subsequent models (4, 5, and 6), I compute 
the cross- level interaction effects. I plot the interactions that are significant 
at the 0.10 level or better to ease interpretation (see Figure 2).
The cross- level interaction hypotheses state that the company- level effects 
of union organization on strike incidence are weaker in countries with 
higher levels of union density, with more confederations, and with a decen-
tralized union system. To support these hypotheses, negative interaction ef-
fects should appear between a company’s union membership rate (Model 
4), multi- unionism (Model 5), union- dominated works councils (Model 6), 
and the country- level variables.
The results show that the firm- level association between union organiza-
tion and strikes is influenced by national context, especially a country’s de-
gree of union decentralization seems to matter. In Model 4, a negative 
interaction coefficient is found between a country’s degree of union decen-
tralization and the company- level effect of union membership rate. Figure 
2A clearly shows that the positive effect of membership rate on strike inci-
dence is weaker in countries with a decentralized labor movement and 
stronger in countries with a more centralized labor movement. Model 5 
shows significant negative interaction between a country’s degree of union 
decentralization and multi- unionism. As indicated in Figure 2B, this interac-
tion implies that the impact of multi- unionism on strikes is negative in de-
centralized union systems but positive in centralized systems. Figure 2C, 
based on Model 6, shows a similar pattern for the interaction between a 
country’s degree of union decentralization and the union- member domina-
tion of the local employee representative body. The effect of union- 
dominated councils on strikes is positive in countries in which union 
decentralization is low, but this effect is negative when union decentraliza-
tion is high.8
Table 2 also demonstrates some support for the moderating effect of the 
national levels of union density. As expected, the interactions between the 
union organization variables at the company level and the union density rate 
at the country level are negative and significant, except for company- level 
8 To eliminate the possibility that the country- specific effects of union- dominated works councils are 
artifacts of the differences in the status and structure of disparate EU nations (Gumbrell- McCormick and 
Hyman 2010), I calculated the interaction between the union domination over the local works council 
and the type of system (dual vs. single channel systems). This interaction was not significant, nor was the 
effect of the works council stronger in countries with greater legal mandates.
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union membership (Model 4). Model 5 clearly shows that the positive effect 
of multi- unionism (0.519) on strike incidence is weaker when the union 
density rate at the country level increases (–0.030). This finding might sup-
port the assumption that multi- unionism is positively associated with strike 
incidence because competing unions use strikes to attract new members 
(Dobson 1997). There might be less need for unions to attract new mem-
bers when national membership rates are high. At maximum union density, 
the effect of multi- unionism is even negative, see Figure 2D. Again, a similar 
pattern is found for the interaction between country- level union density 
and union domination over the local works council. Figure 2E, based on 
Model 6, shows that the effect of union- dominated councils on strikes is 
positive in countries with low union density, but this effect is negative when 
union density is high.
All in all, Table 2 provides strong support for Hypothesis 6 on the impact 
of union decentralization and moderate support for Hypothesis 4 on the 
role of national union density. Hypothesis 5, however, cannot be confirmed. 
The number of union confederations in a country does not influence any of 
the company- level union organization effects.
Conclusion
In this article, I investigated the occurrence of strikes in EU companies. 
First, I determined the extent to which union organization was associated 
with strike incidence at the level of individual firms. The analyses based on 
large- scale, cross- national, and firm- level data demonstrate clear evidence 
that local union organization affects the likelihood that a company will ex-
perience a strike. I have shown that the proportion of union members in 
the workforce, the number of represented unions, and the majority of 
union members who serve as employee representatives generally increase 
the incidence of strikes in a company. My findings not only confirm that the 
relationship between union organization and strikes exists at the company 
level but also prove that the interplay between different types of organiza-
tion may lead to different outcomes in disparate companies. On the one 
hand, I have shown that the organizational resources associated with high 
membership density can be undermined by interunion competition. On 
the other hand, however, no evidence supports that multi- unionism under-
mines the organizational capacity of union- dominated works councils. Nor 
do I find that a strong position on the works council substitutes the organi-
zational resources of high levels of union membership. Yet, this research 
shows that the effects of union organization on strike incidence depend on 
the constellation of local union resources and constraints.
Next, I showed that the company- level effects of union organization on 
strikes vary across countries. Previous studies have already suggested that 
the extent to which organizational resources are associated with the ability 
of unions to initiate a strike differs across countries. Previous studies, how-
ever, did not conduct large- scale comparisons. By analyzing more than 5,000 
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firms across all EU member states, I have demonstrated, for example, that 
the effect of the membership rate on strike incidence is smaller in France, 
Greece, and Italy compared with many other countries. This finding pro-
vides a broader international perspective for Coutrot’s (1998) observation 
that the ability of unions to initiate a strike in France is less dependent on 
membership levels than in Britain. Moreover, my results support the argu-
ment that union competition has different effects on strike incidence across 
different contexts. I found substantial cross- national differences in the 
strength and nature of the multi- unionism/strike relationship. This rela-
tionship was sometimes positive, sometimes negative, and sometimes non-
existent. At the company- level, however, I had no information on how 
various unions are organized; the ECS- 2009 data provide information only 
on the number of unions at the workplace, and not whether disparate 
unions have a distinct occupational, political, or religious basis. For future 
research, this again raises the question about the mechanisms by which 
multi- unionism is associated with strike activity, and whether different expla-
nations apply in different contexts (Akkerman 2008).
Finally, I determined the extent to which a country’s trade union system 
influences the company- level effects of union organization on strike inci-
dence. My findings confirm that micro- level labor relationships and their 
outcomes should be studied within their macro- level contexts. I showed that 
the level of union density in a country, the number of union confederations 
and the degree of union decentralization directly affect the likelihood of 
industrial action in individual companies. This implies that after accounting 
for company- specific characteristics of union organization and other firm- level 
variables, a company is more likely to experience a strike when it is estab-
lished in a country with high membership rates, more confederations, and a 
decentralized union movement.
Through cross- level interactions I was able to show that a country’s de-
gree of union decentralization influences the firm- level association between 
union organization and strikes. Generally, I found that the company- level 
effects of union organization on strikes are weaker in countries where the 
union movement is more decentralized. In decentralized systems, work-
place branches have greater autonomy to launch a strike and will therefore 
be less reliant on organizational resources and constraints. The same might 
apply to countries with high union density. Firm- level resources like works- 
council domination, or constraints like interunion competition, are less 
strongly associated with strikes when national membership rates are high. 
Interestingly, a strong union at the local employee representative body may 
even mitigate potential conflict in case of high national membership levels, 
and in case the labor movement is highly decentralized. What is also clear 
from the analysis is that the number of union confederations in a country 
did not interact with any of the company- level union organization variables. 
Although strikes are more likely in countries with multiple confederations, 
the number of confederations did not moderate the effects of firm- level 
union organization on strikes.
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Using a multilevel analysis of international, firm- level data, I demon-
strated that the magnitude and nature of the relationship between union 
organizations and workplace strikes depends on the labor movement con-
text within a country. A few reservations apply with regard to this article. 
Although organizational resources help to explain the capacity for strike mo-
bilization, a focus on resources provides little information on the sources of 
labor conflict. Resource mobilization theory may be criticized for disregard-
ing the relationship between variation in workplace grievances and strike 
incidence, implicitly assuming a “constancy of discontent” (cf. McAdam, 
McCarthy, and Zald 1988: 697). To even better understand the conditions 
under which resources matter, future research may expand the models pre-
sented here by acknowledging the variation in workplace grievances. Next, 
the large- scale analyses presented here come at the cost of detail with re-
gard to the country- specific features of bargaining systems or economic con-
ditions. Subsequent studies might more thoroughly address the differences 
in union or federation structures across nations. Next, other country- level 
characteristics might affect labor relationships and collective action at the 
level of individual firms. For example, Brandl and Traxler (2010) summa-
rized an extensive list of potential economic and institutional factors that 
shape the opportunity and constraints for industrial conflict. Moreover, 
contexts can change. This study, which used data for 2009, is a snapshot of 
European companies during an economic crisis. Longitudinal data would 
be required to determine whether time- varying conditions influence the re-
sults presented here. I leave it to future research to address these issues. In 
doing so, the methodological approach taken in this article, despite its limi-
tations, is promising.
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Appendix A
Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics of the Company- Level Variables
Variables Mean
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Strike incidence 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Union membership 0.00 0.63 –2.21 1.70
Multi- unionism 0.00 0.45 –1.38 1.78
Union- dominated works council 0.00 0.43 –0.96 0.76
Economic activity
 C- D- E 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
 NACE F 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
 NACE G 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00
 NACE H 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
 NACE I 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
 NACE J 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
 NACE K 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
 NACE L 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
 NACE M 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
 NACE N 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
 NACE O 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Company size
 10–19 employees 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
 20–49 employees 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
 50–99 employees 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
 100–199 employees 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
 200–399 employees 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
 400–500 employees 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
 500+ employees 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Public sector 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Company status
 Independent 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00
 Subsidiary site 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
 Headquarters 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
 Unknown 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
Level of collective agreement
 No collective agreement 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
 Company level 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
 Higher level 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
 Mixed 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Source: ECS- 2009.
Note: N = 5,873.
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Table A.2. Descriptive Statistics of the Country- Level Variables
Country Union density Number of confederations Union decentralization
Austria 29.08 1.00 1.00
Belgium 51.87 3.00 3.00
Bulgaria 20.09 3.00 4.00
Cyprus 54.30 4.00 4.00
Czech Republic 17.42 4.00 5.00
Denmark 67.61 4.00 2.00
Estonia  7.27 2.00 5.00
Finland 67.52 3.00 2.00
France  7.63 7.00 5.00
Germany 19.12 3.00 0.00
Greece 23.97 2.00 5.00
Hungary 16.81 6.00 4.50
Ireland 35.20 1.00 5.00
Italy 33.43 7.00 3.00
Latvia 14.80 1.00 6.00
Lithuania  8.47 3.00 6.00
Luxembourg 37.33 4.00 2.00
Malta 51.22 3.00 7.00
Netherlands 19.04 3.00 0.00
Poland 15.60 3.00 5.00
Portugal 20.49 4.00 4.00
Romania 32.83 5.00 4.00
Slovakia 17.17 2.00 5.00
Slovenia 29.66 7.00 4.00
Spain 15.01 6.00 4.00
Sweden 68.77 3.00 0.00
United Kingdom 27.63 1.00 5.00
Source: Visser (2011).
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